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Abstract
We use an analogy between non-isomorphic mathematical structures defined over
the same set and the algebras induced by associative and causal levels of informa-
tion in order to argue that Reinforcement Learning, in its current formulation, is
not a causal problem, independently if the motivation behind it has to do with an
agent taking actions.
1 Introduction
There is an open debate about Reinforcement Learning (RL) being a Causal problem or not. Accord-
ing to Sutton and Barto (1998), the RL problem is to learn some task in an interactive way, and the
now standard solution consists in assigning values for the different states, or values, which certain
stochastic proces can take. It has been argued that RL is essentially a control problem, and since
in a RL problem agent performs interventions in a given environment, then this is a causal problem
(Szepesvari (2018), Sutton et al. (1992)). RL can also help to understand human-learning processes
and their causal interpretation (Gershman (2015)); in fact, since human beings conceive their ac-
tions as interventions in the world, and humans actively perceive their environment by predicting
the outcomes of such interventions (Clark (2015)) it is tempting to consider RL as a causal problem
in nature.
The objective of the most-common used RL algorithms is to find a policy, which is a map between
states and actions, which is interpreted as what should a rational agent do if he finds himself in such
state. RL, both in its formulation, its optimality criteria and the algorithms involved, use operations
based on associative information, but do not make use of causal operations. Here we argue that RL
and causal reasoning are inherently different problems, and by presenting an analogy in terms of
algebraic structures we argue that once established the different algebras that associative and causal
information induce we can not mix between them irrespective of the motivation or real-life situation
that lies behind.
2 Levels of formulation of a problem
When talking about a problem one must be careful and distinguish between a real world situation
and what mathematical formulation of such situation. In the problem of learning by interaction, the
intuition is of an intelligent agent manipulating his environment and learning from the consequences
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of his actions via a reward function. The standard formulation of such problems is through a Markov
Decision Process, or some variants of it. An optimal policy is what the scientific comunity has
accepted to be the solution of mathematical problem generated the learning by interaction problem,
and several algorithms have been proposed to find a such policy.
Even while the intuition behind RL is that of an agent interacting with an environment, it does not
mean that the mathematical model of such agent captures the notion of his actions as interventions
in the environment; this only remains from a linguistic confusion between a real life situation, and
a mathematical model. RL and the mathematical tools used in its formulation operate only at the
associative level of information; this is, RL can only learn from correlations in data. As Pearl puts
it, RL only operates in the first level of causal reasoning and lacks the necessary tools of the upper
levels: interventions and counterfactuals.
3 Causal and associative algebras
As a simpler case, consider the structures G1 = (Z,+) where + is the usual sum, and G2 = (Z, ·)
where · is the usual multiplication. It is clear that G1 and G2 do not have the same algebraic struc-
ture; more specificaly, G1 is an abelian group while G2 is only a semigroup (Hungerford (1974));
therefore, any equation stated in G1 can not be solved using methods valid forG2. This is, consider
the equation:
a+ b = c, (1)
which must be solved for a if b and c are known. Given that G1 and G2 are clearly not isomorphic,
we can not attempt to solve for a using any insight provided by knowledge of G2; even if, on an
upper level, we knew that on (R,+, ·) b has the form, say, b = df , we must solve for a only in
the domain of addition; other examples are the Z4 group, which is not isomorphic to Klein’s group
Z2 × Z2, or the Hamilton quaternions H, which are an abelian group under addition but not under
its respective multiplication.
Considering the manipulationist notion of causation (Woodward (2003)), which contains both
Pearl’s Structural Causal Models (Pearl (2009)) and Spirtes’ Causation (Spirtes et al. (2000)), we
recognize two fundamental aspects: an implicit order  and the presence of a context Z . On the
other hand, if considering only associative information, there is no distinguishable order even in the
case of stochastically dependant variables; notice that any distribution p(X,Y ) can be expressed
either as p(X |Y )p(Y ) or P (Y |X)p(Y ).
Let
⊕
and
⊗
the operators representing the associative algebra and the causal algebra; i.e., two
variables A, and B which are correlated are represented as
⊕
(A,B) while a variable, or event A
which causes some other B are represented by
⊗
(A,B). Even more specificaly,
⊗
should be
written as
⊗
(Z,)
4 Reinforcement Learning
Let
aR(β)b (2)
a relation between a and b, where β are parameters which expressR univocally. In particular, in RL
we must find
β = f [aRb] (3)
where R =
⊕
, and f a function which depends on the state and reward of the system through only
associative operations (e.g., the Q function). And here in this point we have our main argument:
since R is the associative algebra, and such algebra can not be isomortphic to the causal algebra
because of the lack of order, then we can not use causal tools to solve for β, and therefore RL is not
a causal problem. This is,
a
⊕
b (4)
and
a
⊗
(Z,)b (5)
are different problems, which must be solved with their respective tools. This said, current reinforce-
ment learning problems can not be considered to be causal if their mathematical formulation relies
only on associative tools.
2
5 Conclusion
We have argued that problems that can be solved at the associative level of information must be
solved using the respective tools, and the same applies for causal problems. One must be careful
not to mix the language and framework induced by the chosen formulation in order to model some
real-life situation. The classical RL formulation could, in principle, be modified in order to allow a
proper causal formulation; we speculate that the Bellman equations for the V andQ functions could
be modified, for a deterministic policy and reward, in the following way:
vpi(s) =
∑
s′,r
P
g(s′|s, do(a))[r + γvpi(s
′)], (6)
qpi(s, a) =
∑
s′,r
P
g(s′|s, do(a))[r + γmax
a
q(s′, a′)], (7)
where Pg is the probability distribution induced by a Causal Graphical Model g
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